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“We kind of lost our way, AIG did, and we got out of the basic insurance business that we know so
well [...].”
Edward M. Liddy, CEO, American International Group, October 22, 2008
1 Introduction
Are some insurers relevant for the stability of the financial system? And if yes, what firm char-
acteristics make these insurers diﬀerent from insurers that are not systemically important? The
financial crisis of 2007-2009 is widely regarded to have originated in the banking sector and, more
specifically, in the market for U.S. subprime mortgages. Since those years, economists and policy-
makers have devoted considerable eﬀort to the identification of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) and the enactment of tougher capital requirements for banks. However, an early
peak in the financial crisis was not caused by the default of a bank but rather by the near-collapse
of the multinational insurance company American International Group (AIG). In this paper, we in-
vestigate whether U.S. insurers (apart from AIG) became systemically important during the recent
financial crisis and examine which idiosyncratic factors were the key drivers of systemic risk in
insurance. We find that several insurers did indeed contribute significantly to the instability of the
U.S. financial sector. Our analysis reveals that insurers that were larger, that relied more heavily
on non-policyholder liabilities and that had higher investment income were severely exposed to
the adverse eﬀects of the financial crisis. However, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk is
found to be only determined on insurer size.
Until the onset of the financial crisis, financial economists questioned the very existence of
systemic risks in the insurance industry. In contrast to banks, insurers do not accept customer de-
posits and thus do not face the risk of a sudden liquidity shortage following a bank run.1 Moreover,
an “insurance run” in the form of the cancellation of a large number of insurance policies is also
highly unlikely because the cancellation of long-term life insurance policies, for example, usually
1 For some recent studies on systemic risk in banking during the subprime crisis see, e.g., IMF (2010); Longstaﬀ
(2010); Brunnermeier et al. (2012).
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implies the realization of severe losses, whereas closing a bank account only implies losses on
future interest. In addition, insurers must fulfill more rigorous capital requirements than other fi-
nancial institutions, thus limiting their potential to destabilize the financial system (see Harrington,
2009). Finally, the hierarchical structure of the insurance industry and the reliance on long-term
funding are additional factors that can reduce the systemic relevance of insurers.
Contrary to the belief that insurers are not systemically relevant, insurers nevertheless suﬀered
severe losses on their respective stocks during the financial crisis, with the stocks of U.S. non-life
insurers performing even more poorly than the stocks of U.S. banks.
— insert Figure 1 here —
As seen from the plots of the four diﬀerent industry indexes in Figure 1, U.S. insurers did not
fare significantly better than U.S. banks in 2007-2009. This performance underlines the conjecture
that insurers are susceptible to systemic risk in the financial sector. However, the near-collapse
of AIG has led academics and regulators to reassess the possibility of insurers themselves be-
coming systemically important. Recent studies on the potential systemic relevance of insurers
unanimously argue that an insurer can pose a risk to the financial system if it becomes too similar
to a bank. For example, both the Geneva Association (2010) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS, 2012) argue that some insurers could contribute to the instability of
the global financial sector under some circumstances, citing non-core and non-insurance activities
as the major drivers of systemic risk in the insurance industry.2 Moreover, the recently developed
methodology for identifying globally systemically important financial institutions (GSIFIs) by the
IAIS additionally cites several idiosyncratic insurer characteristics as possible drivers of systemic
risks in insurance. Despite these recent eﬀorts by insurance regulators, however, we know rela-
tively little about the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize the financial sector.
We empirically test hypotheses that insurers could be susceptible and contribute to systemic
risk and find strong evidence of a significant exposure to systemic risk across all major U.S. insur-
2 In a similar fashion, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) argue that non-core activities of banks like, e.g., investment
banking increased systemic risk in the U.S. prior and during the financial crisis.
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ers in our sample while larger insurers also contributed significantly to systemic fragility. Using a
sample of 89 publicly listed U.S. life, non-life and reinsurers, we show that insurers did not only
suﬀer from the externalities caused by the financial crisis, but also contributed to the severity of
the crisis. Both eﬀects are statistically and economically significant.To measure an insurer’s expo-
sure and contribution to a tail event across the financial sector, we employ the Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) and ΔCoVaR methodology, respectively. Our key result for the MES is that the
average insurer in our sample lost 6.5% on its stocks on those days that the financial sector crashed
during the financial crisis from July 2007 to December 2008. This result is not only highly statis-
tically significant but also economically significant, considering the fact that a comparable sample
of large U.S. banks analyzed by Acharya et al. (2010) suﬀered average losses of only 1.63% on
these days. Similarly, insurers had a statistically and economically significant mean ΔCoVaR of
-3.7% during the crisis and thus contributed considerably to the crisis themselves.
Given the knowledge that several insurers did indeed contribute to systemic risk in the U.S.
during the financial crisis, we then turn to our second research question: Why did these insurers
become systemically relevant for the financial sector? More specifically, we answer the question:
Which idiosyncratic factors made these insurers diﬀerent from other insurers that did not destabi-
lize the financial sector? As candidate determinants of systemic risk, we focus our attention on the
factors used in the methodology proposed by the IAIS. In its consultation paper, the IAIS hypothe-
sizes that insurer size is the main determinant of the systemic risk of an insurer. The motivation be-
hind the use of firm size as an indicator of systemic relevance is obvious at first glance and parallels
similar arguments brought forward for large banks. The larger an insurer is and the more services
it provides, the higher its systemic relevance will be. In cases in which a large insurer defaults,
the resulting negative externalities in the form of directly imposed losses on other institutions and
doubts about the health of other insurers could then destabilize the entire financial system.3 The
ensuing fire sales of insurance contracts by the remaining life and non-life insurers, e.g., because
of a margin spiral, financial frictions or statutory reserve regulation (see Koijen and Yogo, 2013),
3 For a more detailed discussion of the too-big-to-fail diﬃculty in banking, see Mishkin (1999).
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could in turn force asset prices to further plummet, thus intensifying contagion among insurers and
other financial institutions.4 Consequently, similar to banks, insurers could become too-big-to-fail
providing managers with an incentive to take on more risks than is socially optimal. The positive
relation between insurer size and systemic risk, however, is no longer as obvious on closer inspec-
tion. As an insurer grows, so does its risk pool, improving the insurer’s opportunity to diversify. 5
Despite this factor, the IAIS also identifies global diversification because a possible driving fac-
tor of systemic risks in insurance. Empirical evidence by Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2012), however,
clearly rejects this hypothesis as cross-border mergers are shown to limit rather than increase the
contribution of an acquiring insurer to systemic risk. In contrast, diversifying mergers across in-
surance lines are found to have an increasing eﬀect on the systemic risk of insurers, thus partially
supporting the regulators’ argument.
Further potential sources of systemic risk in insurance could arise, for example, from the in-
terconnectedness of an insurer with other financial institutions, most notably banks. Although the
empirical evidence by Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2012) is supportive of a one-directional
relation between the systemic risks of banks and insurers, systemic risks in insurance still could
spill over into other portions of the financial sector via losses incurred in the insurers’ asset man-
agement. In addition, insurers engaging too heavily in non-core activities as well as derivatives
trading could also single-handedly destabilize the financial sector.6
Finally, the recent study of Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) documents the finding that the sensitivity
of a financial institution to crises and market turmoil is significantly aﬀected by persistence in the
institution’s risk culture and/or business model. In their work, bank performance during the LTCM
4 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) cite margin (or haircut) spirals and precautionary hoarding behavior as rea-
sons why financial institutions could engage in fire sales. Their theoretical model of a margin spiral is supported
by the empirical evidence found by Adrian and Shin (2010).
5 Due to this, the use of insurer size as an indicator of systemic risk in the IAIS methodology was heavily criticized
by the Secretary General of the Geneva Association, John Fitzpatrick, who stated: “The insurance business is
based on the law of large numbers, that as the number of risks in a portfolio increases the riskiness of the portfolio
decreases.[...] Several of the indicators penalise this natural risk reduction rather than reward it.”
6 Bartram et al. (2011) show in their empirical study that the use of financial derivatives significantly reduces both
total risk and systematic risk of industrial firms. Although the use of derivatives for hedging purposes is usually
associated with a decrease in firm risk, excessive derivatives trading by insurers has nevertheless been cited as a
major source of systemic risk during the financial crisis (see Cummins and Weiss, 2010).
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crisis in 1998 is revealed to be an economically significant predictor of the performance during the
financial crisis. In a related study, Aebi et al. (2012) show that the performance of banks during
the financial crisis was driven partially by the quality of the banks’ risk governance. A similar
view is shared by Diamond and Rajan (2009), who also emphasize that flaws in risk governance
contributed to the poor performance of banks during the financial crisis. In theory, these findings
should apply to insurers as well. For example, the contribution of an insurer to systemic risk could
simply be driven by a persistent risk culture of overly risky underwriting or asset management. In
addition, we would expect insurers with more elaborate risk governance to fare better in times of a
systemic crisis, which in turn should stabilize the entire financial sector. Until now, however, these
hypotheses concerning the drivers of systemic risk in insurance have not been analyzed.
We perform a variety of regressions to explain the cross-sectional variation in both the con-
tribution as well as the exposure of U.S. insurers to system-wide tail events and find that insur-
ers that were significantly exposed to systemic risk were larger and relied more heavily on non-
policyholder liabilities and on investment income. This result holds after controlling for the higher
investment income to net revenues ratio of life insurers and regardless of whether we include rein-
surers in our sample. Conversely, the contribution to systemic risk is driven only by insurer size
with AIG, Prudential, Metlife and Genworth being major systemically important insurers. The ev-
idence we find poses a substantial challenge to the recently proposed methodology of the IAIS for
identifying systemically important insurers. On the one hand, few of the IAIS factors like insurer
size and investment activity and success are shown to be valid predictors of an insurer’s systemic
relevance. On the other hand, we find several of their indicators to be uncorrelated with an insurer’s
contribution to systemic risk. In particular, substitutability, global activity and the interconnected-
ness with the reinsurance industry do not predict the systemic relevance of an insurer and thus
should not be penalized by the IAIS assessment methodology. Finally, we perform probit regres-
sions in which we predict the membership of insurers in the top quartile of systemic risk exposure
as well as the probability of a bailout. Our results confirm that size, non-policyholder liabilities
and investment income can be used to identify insurers that are most vulnerable to systemic tail
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events while insurer size predicts the probability of a bailout.
Our paper is related to several recent studies on the financial crisis. The majority of these
papers, however, are concerned with the performance of banks and its determinants rather than
systemic risk. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) study the performance of a global sample of banks and
find that banks with more fragile financing and with better governance performed worse during
the financial crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks with CEOs whose incentives
were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse during the crisis. Similarly,
Cheng et al. (2010) show that the excess compensation of managers is positively correlated with
risk taking, pushing managers towards a risky business model. The performance of banks during
the financial crisis is also investigated by Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), who show that banks that per-
formed worse during the LTCM crisis also performed worse during the credit crisis. Our paper is
also related to the works of Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Hovakimian et al. (2012) on the con-
tribution of U.S. banks to systemic risk. Whereas Brunnermeier et al. (2012) show that non-core
activities such as investment banking proxied by a high non-interest income are positively related
to a bank’s ΔCoVaR and MES, Hovakimian et al. (2012) find bank size, leverage and asset risk to
be the key drivers of systemic risk. In contrast to the aforementioned studies on banks, however,
we concentrate our analysis on the potentially significant contribution of insurers to systemic risk.
Turning to the previous insurance literature, our work is related to the analysis in
Cummins and Weiss (2010), who hypothesize that non-core activities and high degrees of inter-
connectedness are the primary causes of insurers’ systemic relevance. The potential of the insur-
ance industry to destabilize the financial sector is also confirmed by Billio et al. (2012) who find
that the illiquidity of both bank and insurance assets makes these sectors a source of systemic
risk. In contrast to these findings, Chen et al. (2012) find in their analysis of credit default swap
and intraday stock price data that banks create significant systemic risk for insurers but not vice
versa. Although these studies shed some light on the question of whether the interconnectedness of
banks and insurers could destabilize the financial sector, they do not answer the question regarding
whether insurers actually did contribute to the severity of the financial crisis. Acharya et al. (2009)
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take a first step in this direction by analyzing the contribution of large U.S. insurers to the insta-
bility of the financial sector after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. These researchers document
the first empirical evidence of a systemic relevance of large insurers but do not perform a cross-
sectional analysis of the systemic risk contributions that were found. Extending these few studies
on systemic risk in insurance, our paper thus constitutes the first analysis of the contribution of
U.S. insurers to systemic risk and of the determinants of this destabilizing eﬀect during the credit
crisis.
Finally, our paper is also related to the growing body of literature on systemic risk measure-
ment.7 Using well-known risk measures from firm-level risk measurement, Acharya et al. (2010)
and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) propose competing measures for the contribution of an indi-
vidual financial institution to the stability of the financial sector. Whereas the ΔCoVaR measure
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) is based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a given institution con-
ditional on the financial sector being under distress, Acharya et al. (2010) propose an extension
of the ΔCoVaR called Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is simply defined as the average return
on a firm’s stock on those days the financial sector experienced its 5% worst returns. We follow
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and argue that ΔCoVaR can be used to measure an insurer’s con-
tribution to a systemic crisis whereas the MES measures the financial institution’s exposure to a
systemic crisis.8 As a robustness check, we control for the fact that both MES and ΔCoVaR do not
incorporate measures of firm leverage into the assessment of systemic risk and estimate the SRISK
measure of Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya et al. (2012) and find that our conclusions
remain unchanged.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the
methodology used in our empirical study. Section 3 presents the results of our investigation into
the determinants of systemic risk in the U.S. insurance industry. The concluding remarks are given
7 Various other measures of systemic risk have been proposed in the literature following the financial crisis. Further
examples for such measures apart from those used in this study are due to De Jonghe (2010); Huang et al. (2011);
Schwaab et al. (2011); Hautsch et al. (2012) and White et al. (2012).
8 The fundamental diﬀerence between ΔCoVaR and MES is that the conditioning has been switched. Note that the
MES is closely related to the ΔCoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) as well as the systemic risk
measures by Huang et al. (2011) in which the conditioning has also been switched.
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in Section 4.
2 Data
The following section outlines the construction of our sample as well as data sources, defines
the main dependent and independent variables used in the statistical analysis and presents descrip-
tive statistics of our data.
2.1 Sample construction and data sources
To construct our sample, we select all publicly traded insurance companies with U.S. head-
quarters, using the country and dead-firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream.9 To
minimize a potential survivorship bias, we also include insurance companies that failed or were
delisted during or after our sample period. Financial accounting data are retrieved from Thomson
Reuters Worldscope. We chose to retrieve data from Datastream rather than Compustat due to the
wider market coverage of firms in the former after 1998 (see, e.g., Ulbricht and Weiner, 2005, for a
comparison of both databases) and the availability of some additional data items for insurers. Our
initial sample consists of 154 insurance companies, from which we exclude companies for which
Datastream does not contain stock prices for the years 2006 to 2008. Also excluded are firms with
only incomplete data on the balance-sheet variables that we use (25 insurers). Note that excluding
insurers with incomplete data from our analysis could possibly lead to a selection bias in our results
because the incompleteness of an insurer’s data could be the result of the insurer’s opacity. Our
sample could thus be biased because (presumably) systemically riskier insurance firms are system-
atically omitted.10 To rule out such a selection bias, for each of the insurance companies omitted
from our sample based on either missing stock or balance-sheet data (or both), we manually check
9 Several recent studies by, e.g., Karolyi et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2011) make similar use of Datastream due to
its broad and deep coverage of the global stock market.
10 In a recent study on European banking, Vallascas and Keasey (2012) investigate the relation between systemic
risk and bank opacity showing that a bank’s transparency contributes to the reduction of its systemic risk potential.
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whether at least one annual report is available from a publicly accessible data source.11 For all
omitted firms, annual reports thus could be found.
Next, we retrieve additional accounting data and information on the insurers’ lines of business
and corporate governance from the insurers’ 2006 10-K and DEF 14A filings with the SEC. For
this purpose, we employ the Morningstar Document Research database.12 We then match firms in
Datastream/Worldscope and Morningstar by the use of the insurers’ ticker symbol (Worldscope
data item WC05601) and exclude 23 firms for which Morningstar does not include the insurer’s
10-K filing for the year 2006.
The definition of life and non-life insurance companies in the company lists of Datastream
is somewhat fuzzy.13 Therefore, the industry classification of Datastream is cross-checked with
the firms’ SIC code (Worldscope data item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331, 6351, 6361,
6399) and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code (Worldscope data item WC07040,
ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms that cannot be clearly classified as life or non-life insurance
companies.14 Additionally, all company names are manually screened for words that might suggest
the non-insurance nature of the companies’ business, and the respective companies are excluded
from the sample. This screening reduces the sample size to 91 firms.
For reasons of relevance, we concentrate on insurance firms with total assets in excess of $ 100
million at the end of 2011. In a related study, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) restrict their sample to
banks with total assets in excess of $ 10 billion. Their analysis, however, focuses on the cross-
sectional determinants of the performance of already systemically relevant banks during the recent
financial crisis.15 Because our study is concerned with the determinants of the systemic relevance
(or irrelevance) of insurers, however, a too-strict size requirement would prevent a cross-sectional
analysis of the eﬀects of insurer size on systemic relevance. This size requirement leads to the
11 Usually, annual reports could be found on the respective company’s webpage.
12 Morningstar Document Research (10k Wizard) oﬀers the user the ability to access Form 10-K and 10-Q filings
of U.S. firms online.
13 For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insurance compa-
nies in Datastream’s company lists.
14 Consequently, HMOs and managed care insurance companies are not included in the final sample.
15 The $ 10 billion-size threshold is derived by the threshold of $ 50 billion total assets postulated in the Dodd-Frank
Act.
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exclusion of one insurer.
Next, to control for known data errors in Datastream, we apply several screening procedures
for the daily returns on the insurers’ stock prices. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) and first
exclude from our sample the days in which the stock price of the respective insurer drops at least
once below a minimum price of $1 to control for a bias induced by the practice in Datastream of
rounding prices. Second, we check our sample for insurers with at least one monthly return above
300% that is reversed in the following month.16 We find that none of the remaining insurers in our
sample suﬀers from such erroneous stock prices.17 Third, we manually check the data for other
non-trivial data errors and anomalies, which leads to the exclusion of Berkshire Hathaway from
our sample because of its unusually high stock price. Finally, we identify non-trading days as those
days on which the ten largest companies in our sample (with respect to their market capitalization)
exhibit a stock return equal to zero. Days which contain more than 80% zero returns across our
sample are treated as “missing”. Our final sample thus consists of 89 U.S. insurance firms. For
increased transparency, all insurers in our final sample are listed in Appendix I. To ensure that our
sample and the coverage in Datastream are representative of the U.S. insurance industry, we first
check whether our sample includes the constituents of selected insurance sector indices. As an
example, we check whether the firms listed in the KBW Insurance Index (KIX) are included in our
sample, finding a broad coverage of the KIX (20 out of 24 companies in our final sample, with all
24 firms listed in the KIX entering our initial sample). Furthermore, we compute the total market
capitalization of the insurers in our sample ($ 726 billion) and compare the results with the statistics
on the market capitalization of the U.S. insurance industry in the Yahoo Finance Industry Browser.
The results show that our sample is suﬃciently representative of the U.S. insurance industry.
16 More precisely, given two monthly returns Rt and Rt−1, we check if either Rt or Rt−1 is greater than 300%, and
(1+Rt) · (1+Rt−1)− 1 < 50%. Although the 300% threshold is somewhat arbitrary, Ince and Porter (2006) show
that this threshold appears to perform well for minimizing diﬀerences between returns calculated from stock
prices taken from Datastream and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases.
17 We also reestimate our analyses using stock price data from CRSP instead of data from Datastream as a further
robustness check. Our results remain unchanged.
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2.2 Measures of systemic risk
Our analysis focuses on the exposure and contribution of individual insurers to the systemic risk
of the U.S. financial sector during the period July 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008. We follow
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and consider this period as the climax of
the financial crisis to keep our study comparable to their work on bank performance. However,
one could propose diﬀerent definitions of the critical time frame of the credit crisis because both
banks and insurers continued to report severe losses well into 2009. We control for the possibly
confounding eﬀect of our particular choice of the time frame by re-estimating our models of sys-
temic risk for the time period ending December 31, 2009 as well as for the recession dates given
by the NBER (December 2007 to June 2009) in our robustness checks. As our main dependent
variables, we use each insurer’s ΔCoVaR (see Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010) and static MES
(see Acharya et al., 2010) during the climax of the crisis to proxy for the respective insurer’s con-
tribution and exposure to systemic risk, respectively.18 The MES measure we use is criticized by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) in their work on the ΔCoVaR measure of systemic risk for not
addressing the procyclicality stemming from contemporaneous risk measurement and for measur-
ing the exposure of a financial institution and not its contribution to systemic risk. Conversely,
Acharya et al. (2010) emphasize that MES should be preferred to ΔCoVaR due to the former being
based on a coherent risk measure. To address both concerns, both measures of systemic relevance
are used in our study.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) define an institution’s CoVaR as the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
of the financial system conditional on institutions being under distress. An insurer’s contribu-
tion to system risk is then measured as the diﬀerence between CoVaR conditional on the in-
surer being under distress and the CoVaR in the median state of the institution. We follow
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and estimate an insurer’s conditional ΔCoVaR by using the
change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, the diﬀerence between the ten-year Treasury Bond
18 A theoretical and empirical comparison of both MES and ΔCoVaR is given by Benoit et al. (2013) who show
that while ΔCoVaR is the method of choice for ranking systemically important institutions, MES should be used
for forecasting the contribution of a particular institution to the global risk of the financial system.
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and the three-month Treasury bill rate, the change in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds
and the Treasury bill rate, the return on the Case-Shiller Home Price Index, and implied equity
market volatility from VIX as state variables.
Conversely, the MES of an individual insurer is defined as the negative mean of the log returns
on the insurer’s stocks, conditional on the financial sector experiencing its worst 5% outcomes.1920
To proxy for the market return of the financial sector, we use the S&P 500 Financials Sector
Index. The estimation of the static MES is based on very few observations in the extreme tail of
the joint distribution of an insurer’s and the market’s returns. To control for the possibility that
our results are driven by a few outliers in the data (most notably the near-collapse of AIG and
the default of Lehman Brothers), we also use average MES estimates from the dynamic model of
Brownlees and Engle (2012). In their model, the joint behavior of the market and firm returns is
characterized by both time varying volatility and correlation, which are modeled with the TARCH
(see Rabemananjara and Zakoı¨an, 1993) and DCC (see Engle, 2002) specifications. We use this
dynamic model to compute daily MES estimates for all trading days in the crisis period and employ
the average of these daily MES estimates in our robustness checks.
Finally, both MES and ΔCoVaR could be criticized for not taking into account the leverage of a
financial institution. As a remedy, Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) propose
a Systemic Risk Index (SRISK) to measure the expected capital shortfall of a firm in a crisis. The
SRISK estimate for firm i at time t is given by
S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
) − (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t (1)
where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the firm’s book value of debt, LRMES i,t
is the long run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · dynMES ), dynMES is the
dynamically estimated MES and Equityi,t is the firm’s market value of equity. In our study, we
19 A positive MES thus indicates a contribution to systemic risk rather than a stabilizing eﬀect.
20 Note that Acharya et al. (2010) derive their MES measure by dividing the so-called Systemic Expected Shortfall
(i.e., a financial institution’s capital shortage in the event of a systemic crisis) by the firm’s equity. By definition,
the MES should thus (approximately) be scaled by firm size.
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additionally employ SRISK as a further measure of systemic relevance in our robustness checks.
2.3 Key IAIS indicators of systemic relevance
Using the measures mentioned above, we investigate the hypothesis that the extent to which
insurers contributed to the instability of the U.S. financial sector during the crisis can be explained
by the idiosyncratic characteristics of insurers in the year before the start of the crisis. We test this
hypothesis through the use of two sets of idiosyncratic variables. All variables used in our study
are defined in Appendix II.
The first set of independent variables includes several key items in the recently proposed
methodology of the IAIS for identifying systemically relevant insurers. Our particular choice
of variables in this second set is partially dictated by the availability of the data. The methodol-
ogy proposed by the IAIS has been devised for regulators for the use on publicly and non-publicly
available data. Unfortunately, the latter is not available to us. We attempt to alleviate this limitation
and complement the variables taken from Worldscope by using variables extracted from manually
evaluating each insurer’s 10-K filing with the SEC for 2006.
As a first indicator of systemic relevance, we use the logarithm of an insurer’s total assets to
proxy for firm size. We expect the sign of the coeﬃcient of total assets to be unrestricted in our re-
gressions. On the one hand, total assets could be positively correlated with an insurer’s contribution
and exposure to systemic risk, because larger insurance companies have a wider range of diﬀer-
ent risks insured and thus are less prone to suﬀer from cumulative losses (see Hagendorﬀ et al.,
2011). At the same time, larger insurance companies could become too-interconnected-to-fail and
thus systemically relevant (see Acharya et al., 2009). The IAIS shares this latter argument and
proposes insurer size to be a key determinant of an insurer’s ability to destabilize the financial
sector.
Next, we use the variable Net revenues, defined as the total operating revenue of an insurer in
2006. The IAIS uses the revenues of an insurer as an additional proxy for insurer size, arguing
that larger insurers are automatically more systemically relevant. Consequently, we employ Net
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revenues as an alternative to Total assets in our robustness checks. Next, the IAIS follows the
argumentation presented by Cummins and Weiss (2010) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) that non-
core activities of financial institutions were the major drivers of systemic risk before the subprime
crisis. To capture an insurer’s activities outside of the classical insurance business, we thus use
the variable Non-policyholder liabilities, which is defined as the total of balance sheet liabilities
minus total insurance reserves (including benefit and loss reserves, unearned premiums, policy and
contract claims and other reserves). To further proxy for the non-core activities of an insurer, in our
regressions we employ the variable Other income, defined as the residual of total income minus
operating income, non-operating interest income, interest expense on debt and interest capitalized.
Closely related to non-core activities, the systemic relevance of an insurer could be related to an
insurer’s investment activity. For example, life insurers that predominantly derive their revenues
from asset management rather than underwriting could be more intertwined with global financial
markets and could thus contribute more to systemic risk than other insurers. Therefore, we define
the variable Investment success as the ratio of an insurer’s investment income to net revenues to
proxy for the success of the insurer’s asset management. Furthermore, we employ the variable
Investment activity defined as the absolute value of investment income divided by the sum of the
absolute values of investment income and earned premiums to proxy for the degree with which the
insurer derives its income from investing assets rather than earning premiums from underwriting.
To control for the fact that life insurers regularly have higher investment income to net revenues
ratios, in our regressions we also employ a dummy variable called Life insurer, which takes on the
value one for life insurers and zero otherwise.
The contribution of an insurer to systemic risk could also depend on the extent of the insurer’s
global activity. To measure global activity, the IAIS proposes using the number of countries in
which a group operates with branches and/or subsidiaries outside of the home country. We adopt
this IAIS proposal and employ the variable Global activity, which is defined as the number of
countries in which an insurer operates a sales oﬃce and/or subsidiary including the home country.
We retrieve the data from Morningstar on Global activity by searching the 2006 10-K filing of
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each insurer for information on subsidiaries and countries in which the insurer has a business
operation.21 To proxy for the interconnectedness of an insurer with the reinsurance industry, we use
the variables Assumed reinsurance and Ceded reinsurance to describe the ratio of written premiums
ceded to reinsurance to total written premiums and the ratio of assumed reinsurance premiums to
total written premiums, respectively. We expect higher values for both variables to indicate a higher
degree of interconnectedness with the reinsurance business and therefore a higher contribution
to systemic risk. Finally, the IAIS also hypothesizes that unique services of an insurer could
increase the institution’s systemic relevance because its services could not be substituted by other
competitors in case of a default. Ideally, we would like to measure an insurer’s substitutability
by using the direct gross premiums written in certain specialty lines of insurance (e.g., credit
coverage, guarantee coverage and financial guarantee coverage). However, not all insurers in our
sample report premiums written in a diﬀerentiated manner by insurance lines in their 10-K filings.
We therefore construct a score value Substitutability that captures the number of lines of specialty
insurance in which an insurer operates.22
2.4 Insurer characteristics
The second set of variables covers standard firm characteristics taken from insurer balance
sheets and income statements and computed from stock returns. The data are taken from the
Thomson Worldscope database. We employ an insurer’s leverage ratio as an independent variable
in our regressions. We follow Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and approx-
imate an insurer’s leverage as the quasi-market value of assets divided by the market value of
equity in which the quasi-market value of assets is given by the book value of assets minus the
book value of equity plus the market value of equity. We expect the sign of the coeﬃcient of
leverage to be unrestricted. For example, Vallascas and Hagendorﬀ (2011) argue that managers
21 We double check our data with the information given on each insurer’s website on its global sales oﬃces as of
2012, confirming the reliability of the data from the 10-K filings.
22 In contrast to the values of the premiums written, all 10-K filings report the lines of business in which the insurer
operates so that we are able to construct our variable Substitutability for all firms in our sample.
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of highly levered companies could come under pressure from investors to provide enough liquid
assets to cover the payments of interest, which in turn could decrease the insurer’s total risk. On
the other hand, managers could also be inclined to excessively take on risks because leverage
forces managers to increase firm profitability. This view is supported by the empirical evidence by
Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Hovakimian et al. (2012), who find that banks
with low leverage performed better and contributed less to systemic risk during the crisis. Fur-
thermore, in our regressions we use an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the book value
of common equity divided by the market value of common equity. We expect a negative relation
between the market-to-book ratio and the systemic risk because the overvaluation of an insurer
before the crisis could have indicated high growth expectations on the part of the investors. In
turn, overstated growth expectations could have led to excessive risk-taking by managers (see,
e.g., Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2011).
The next variable we consider is a measure of an insurer’s debt maturity. There exists a
wide consensus among economists and regulators that the dependence of certain banks and in-
surers on short-term funding exposed these institutions to liquidity risks during the financial
crisis and ultimately led to significant systemic risks (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Cummins and Weiss, 2010; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Consequently, the IAIS has included the
ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing and total assets in its methodology as a key in-
dicator of systemic relevance. We adopt their line of thought but follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2012)
by using short-term debt relative to total debt rather than total assets as a proxy for short-term
funding. We also use Fixed income, which is defined as the ratio of the value of fixed income secu-
rities investment to total investment to characterize an insurer’s asset portfolio. Insurers in which
Fixed income is higher are insurers with a more conservative asset portfolio before the crisis. If
insurers had invested more strongly in other asset classes (e.g., stocks) rather than fixed income
products, we would expect these insurers to have suﬀered more profoundly from plummeting asset
prices during the crisis, forcing them to engage in fire sales themselves. A more conservative asset
portfolio should thus be negatively related to an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. To further
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characterize the quality of an insurer’s asset portfolio, we also use the variable Asset quality, which
is defined as the ratio of the value of bonds below investment grade and total investments. Again,
we expect a higher asset portfolio quality to be negatively related to an insurer’s contribution to
systemic risk because the insurer was less likely to engage in fire sales. We also use the variable
Liquidity beta, which is defined as the regression liquidity beta of an insurer’s excess return on
the market-wide liquidity innovations, as proposed by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) for the years
2004 to 2006 to proxy for an insurer’s exposure to illiquid assets. If insurers held more liquid
assets, they could have been in a better position to reduce their balance sheet and to avoid financial
distress. However, insurers with more liquid assets could also have been the ones that were more
likely to liquidate assets even during times of market turmoil. Therefore, we have no prediction for
the relation between Liquidity beta and an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. To characterize
the quality of the insurance portfolio, in our cross-sectional analyses we employ an insurer’s Loss
ratio, defined as the claim and loss expense plus long-term insurance reserves divided by premiums
earned, expecting insurers with higher loss ratios to contribute more to systemic risk.
To proxy for an insurer’s profitability, we employ the insurer’s return on assets at the end of
2006 and the variable Income variability, defined as the standard deviation of the insurer’s return
on assets during the years 2004 to 2006. Our prediction is that higher profitability is related to
decreases in an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk because more profitable insurers also have
higher solvency margins and a lower risk of insolvency (see also De Haan and Kakes, 2007). In-
come variability, on the other hand, is expected to be positively related to our measures of systemic
risk because more volatile profits could be indicative of an elevated level of risk-taking by the in-
surer. The contribution of an insurer to the systemic risk of the entire financial sector could also
be driven by the insurer’s risk culture. Following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we also use the buy-
and-hold returns of an insurer during the LTCM crisis in 1998 as a proxy for a more risk-friendly
culture of underwriting risks in our regressions. Next in our regressions, we also use the insur-
ers’ operating eﬃciency, given by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, to control for the
quality of management.
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Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Aebi et al. (2012) emphasize that poor governance
contributed to the severity of losses that banks suﬀered during the financial crisis.23 We therefore
use the variables Board size and Board independence to proxy for the governance of insurers before
the financial crisis. Board size is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on
an insurer’s board. We expect board size to be positively related to systemic risk because larger
boards have been found to destroy firm value and possibly capital buﬀers (see Yermack, 1996). To
proxy for the independence of the board, we use the percentage of independent outside directors
on the board of directors. Because outside directors should be more concerned about the systemic
risk of the financial sector as a whole, we expect Board independence to have a decreasing impact
on the systemic risk of an insurer.
2.5 Descriptive statistics
Table I presents summary statistics for our systemic risk measures and independent variables.
— insert Table I here —
The median and mean MES for our sample of U.S. insurers in the period between July 2007
and December 2008 are 5.91% and 6.5%, respectively. In addition to AIG, five insurers in our
sample received aid under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). All of these bailed-out
insurers are in the top MES quartile and have a significantly higher median and mean MES of
11.9% and 11.5%, respectively. The daily estimates of the MES, computed from the dynamic
model of Brownlees and Engle (2012), are averaged across our full sample period. The resulting
averages are comparable to the static MES estimates, with a median and mean dynamic MES of
5.8% and 6.9%, respectively. The daily MES estimates oﬀer an insight into the temporal evolution
of systemic risk exposure in insurance during the financial crisis. Figure 2 plots the average daily
MES estimates (solid line) together with the MES estimates between the 5% and 95% quantiles
(shaded area).
23 However, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find empirical evidence for the opposite argument that good governance
might have been indicative of banks taking on too many risks before the crisis.
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— insert Figure 2 here —
The dynamic MES estimates illustrate the extreme increase in the average exposure of U.S.
insurers to systemic fragility around and after the collapses of AIG and Lehman Brothers. While
average daily MES estimates were already at an elevated level of 3% to 5% at the start of 2008, the
months following the default of Lehman were characterized by even higher exposure to systemic
risk, with average MES estimates of insurers reaching 27%. Estimates for our measure of an
insurer’s contribution to systemic risk, ΔCoVaR, show that the average U.S. insurer was not only
significantly exposed to systemic risk, but also had a significant impact on financial fragility during
the financial crisis, with a mean ΔCoVaR of -3.7% in our full sample. To further analyze the
relation between an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk on the one hand, and its own contribution
to systemic fragility on the other hand, Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of the average dynamic
MES estimates against the estimates for ΔCoVaR.
— insert Figure 3 here —
We can see from the plot in Figure 3 that an insurer’s contribution and exposure to systemic risk
seem to be positively correlated.24 Although not an indication of a causal relation, the correlation
of -34% between the two systemic risk measures nevertheless hints at the possibility that insurers
that suﬀered from market crashes also contributed themselves to systemic fragility (and vice versa).
On the other hand, the moderately high correlation between MES and ΔCoVaR indicates that both
measures are capturing diﬀerent angles of systemic risk.
Turning to our explanatory variables, insurers in our sample held only negligible amounts of
speculative grade investments prior to the crisis. The mean value of our variable Asset quality is
3%. The median board size is ten, with boards having 81% independent members on average. The
average insurer has 82% of its assets invested in fixed income products and a mean leverage of 4.59.
Because the mean loss ratio of the insurers in our sample is heavily influenced by two outliers, we
concentrate on interpreting its median value. The median loss ratio of 64% is in the typical range
24 Strictly speaking, MES and ΔCoVaR are negatively correlated. However, negative values of ΔCoVaR signify a
positive contribution to systemic fragility.
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for a sample consisting mainly of non-life insurers. The mean market-to-book ratio of insurers is
1.61 and the sub-sample of insurers with stock price data available during the LTCM crisis shows
an average stock performance of -31% in 1998. The majority of our sample insurers relied only
slightly on short-term funding, with the median and mean values of our variable short-term funding
at 0% and 12%, respectively.
Regarding the indicators of systemic risk as proposed by the IAIS, the average insurer in our
sample had total assets of $ 45.03 billion at the end of fiscal year 2006, whereas the median total
assets were significantly lower at only $ 7.26 billion. An average insurer also assumed and ceded
only up to 20% of its total written premiums to reinsurance. The majority of insurers are active
in the U.S. only with no subsidiaries in foreign countries. Several large insurers, however, have
large numbers of subsidiaries around the globe, with AIG being the most globally active insurer
(86 countries). Similarly, the median insurer is active in only one line of specialty insurance. U.S.
insurers are rather heterogeneous with respect to their activity and success in asset management.
Ratios of investment income to net revenues range from -27% to 57% across our full sample and
have a mean value of zero. Values for our variable Investment activity range from zero to 96% with
the mean ratio of absolute investment income to total revenues being 20%. Similarly, the ratio of
the total of balance sheet liabilities minus total insurance reserves to total liabilities, proxying for
Non-policyholder liabilities, ranges from -72% to 92% with median and mean ratios of 22% and
26%, respectively.
3 Why do some insurers become systemically relevant?
In this section, we explore the factors that caused some U.S. insurers to be more susceptible
to turmoil in the financial system than others. Additionally, we address the question why some
insurers became systemically important by significantly contributing to systemic risk during the
financial crisis. We begin our analysis by comparing the characteristics of insurers that were most
exposed to systemic risk (top MES quartile) and those that had the smallest systemic risk exposure
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(bottom MES quartile). After repeating this exercise for an insurer’s contribution to systemic
risk (ΔCoVaR), we then complement these univariate analyses by performing a set of multiple
regressions of both systemic risk measures.
3.1 Characteristics of systemically relevant insurers
For a first impression of the key drivers of an insurer’s systemic risk exposure, we divide
our sample of insurers into the top and bottom contributors to systemic risk based on their MES
estimates. Table II presents a comparison of several descriptive statistics for our dependent and
independent variables for all insurers in the top and bottom MES quartiles. Because a higher value
of the MES indicates a higher exposure to systemic risk, the top quartile contains the group of
insurers that are more susceptible to market crashes than those in the bottom quartile.
– insert Table II here –
As expected, we observe a large diﬀerence in MES between the two quartiles. The mean MES
of insurers in the bottom quartile was approximately 3% over our sample period, whereas insurers
in the top quartile had an average MES of 12%. The results for the dynamic MES estimates are
similar. Insurers in the bottom quartile had a mean dynamic MES of approximately 3%, with the
average dynamic MES in the top quartile of 14%. The results of our third measure of systemic risk,
ΔCoVaR, show a similar picture. Insurers that were systemically relevant according to the MES
estimates were also the ones that contributed the most to systemic risk according to their ΔCoVaR
estimates.
The results presented in Table II show that a lower-quality asset portfolio led to a higher sys-
temic risk exposure for insurers during the crisis. Interestingly, the variability in an insurer’s total
income appears to be negatively related to the insurer’s exposure to systemic risk. Insurers in the
bottom MES quartile had an average income variability of 3.24. In contrast, the average value of
insurers in the top MES quartile was only 1.22. A possible explanation for this finding could be
that higher income variability was related to better growth opportunities and consequently higher
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profits for insurers.25 The significantly higher average return on assets of insurers in the bottom
quartile corroborates this hypothesis.
Insurers that were more exposed to systemic-wide crashes had significantly more leverage on
average, with a mean leverage of 2.87 in the bottom MES quartile and 7.32 in the top quartile. This
finding is in line with the argument stated by Brunnermeier (2009), who argue that more leveraged
institutions could have been more prone to suﬀer from loss spirals during the credit crisis. The
results for the Loss ratio of the two groups of insurers are heavily influenced by one outlier in the
top quartile. The result of the Mann-Whitney test on the diﬀerence in the median MES, however,
confirms that insurers with a higher exposure to systemic risk also had higher loss ratios. Surpris-
ingly, we do not find that an insurer’s exposure to illiquid assets, its performance during the LTCM
crisis, the market-to-book-ratio or the level of short-term debt significantly diﬀered between the
two groups during the financial crisis. Additionally, there is no statistically significant diﬀerence
in the number of directors on the insurer’s board or the percentage of independent outside direc-
tors between the two quartiles. We also find no evidence that insurers that were more exposed to
systemic risk had invested more in fixed income securities before the crisis.
Regarding the key indicators of systemic risk proposed by the IAIS, we find that insurers in the
top MES quartile have significantly higher net revenues and total assets. Insurers in the top quartile
had mean total assets of $ 116.24 billion, whereas insurers in the bottom MES quartile were signif-
icantly smaller with average total assets of $ 4.02 billion. The insurers that were most vulnerable
to market crashes also had significantly higher investment income to net revenues ratios. In addi-
tion, insurers in the top MES quartile had 38% non-policyholder liabilities on average, whereas the
insurers that were less vulnerable to the instability of the financial sector owed only 22% of their
total liabilities to non-policyholders. Furthermore, the insurers that suﬀered the highest losses on
their equity conditional on the U.S. financial sector were more globally active and assumed less
reinsurance than their counterparts. Finally, the mean values for an insurer’s premiums ceded to
25 A similar reasoning underlies the empirical investigation of Bartram et al. (2012) into the question why U.S.
stocks are more volatile than the stocks of similar foreign firms. They find that firm stock volatility is positively
related, e.g., to better investor protection, stock market development and firm-level investment in R&D
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reinsurance and its level of substitutability did not diﬀer significantly between the two groups. To
further underline the findings of our univariate analysis, we plot the insurers’ MES against the in-
surers’ total assets in Figure 4 and against their investment income to net revenues ratios in Figure
5.
– insert Figures 4 and 5 here –
Both plots document a particularly strong positive relation between an insurer’s systemic risk
exposure and its size and investment success.
In the next part of our analysis, we check whether we can find equally strong correlations
between our explanatory variables and an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. To this end,
we split our sample into quartiles based on an insurer’s ΔCoVaR during the financial crisis and
compare descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables for insurers in the bottom (insurers
which contributed the most to financial instability) and top ΔCoVaR quartile.
– insert Table III here –
The results of this analysis are reported in Table III. Again, diﬀerences between the mean
and median ΔCoVaR estimates in both quartiles are large by construction. More interestingly,
insurers that contributed the most to systemic fragility were also characterized by significantly
higher MES (and dynamic MES) estimates and thus a higher exposure to systemic risk. Turning
to the diﬀerences in our independent variables, the results in Table III show a clear picture. In this
univariate setting, an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk seems to be driven only by our two
proxies for insurer size (total assets and net revenues) and its use of reinsurance. Larger insurers
and insurers that assumed (or ceded) less premiums from (to) reinsurers had a higher contribution
to the overall systemic risk of the U.S. financial sector. Diﬀerences for the remaining explanatory
variables between the top and bottom ΔCoVaR quartiles are statistically insignificant.
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3.2 Multiple regressions
The results of our univariate analysis emphasize that the insurers that were more exposed to
systemic risk were larger, relied more strongly on non-policyholder liabilities and had a higher
investment income to net revenues ratio, a higher loss ratio, more leverage, and a lower quality of
asset portfolio. At the same time, insurers appear to contribute to financial fragility if they become
too large or engage less in reinsurance. In this portion of our analysis, we check whether these
results hold when employing these predictors of an insurer’s exposure and contribution to systemic
risk in multiple regressions. Correlations between our independent variables together with p-values
are presented in Appendix III. The majority of the pairs of independent variables do not exhibit
strong correlations. However, some variables are strongly correlated with each other preventing
their simultaneous use in regressions.
In our baseline regressions, our dependent variables are an insurer’s MES and ΔCoVaR, respec-
tively. Because our dependent variables result from a first-stage estimation, our regressions will
likely suﬀer from heteroskedasticity (see Lewis and Linzer, 2005). To control for this source of
heteroskedasticity (and autocorrelation) in the residuals, Newey and West (1987) standard errors
are used. The results of our regressions are presented in Table IV.
– insert Table IV here –
Model (1) in Table IV presents a regression of the insurers’ MES on firm characteristics be-
fore the financial crisis using our full sample of insurers. We do not report the estimates of the
intercept in our regressions models. Our variables Investment success and Investment activity are
highly correlated and consequently, we only employ Investment success in our regressions. Total
assets have a positive significant coeﬃcient, as do Investment success and Non-policyholder lia-
bilities ratios, with all three coeﬃcients being highly statistically significant. All three indicators
from the IAIS methodology, however, are also highly economically significant predictors of an
insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in (log)
Total assets is associated with an increase in an insurer’s MES of 1.99 percentage points (0.010 x
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1.993). One-standard-deviation increases in the ratio of an insurer’s investment income to its total
income and its non-policyholder liabilities are associated with an increase in MES of 0.62 (0.046
x 0.135) and 0.69 percentage point (0.030 x 0.229), respectively. All other indicators of systemic
risk from the proposed methodology of the IAIS do not enter regression (1) with a significant co-
eﬃcient. Most prominently, our proxies for the level of short-term funding, the global activity and
the substitutability of an insurer have no predictive power for its exposure to system risk in the
U.S. financial sector. Complementing our previous finding in the univariate analysis, none of our
corporate governance variables has predictive power for an insurer’s systemic risk exposure.
Regression (2) is the same as our baseline regression (1), except that we now add an in-
surer’s leverage as a further explanatory variable. Due to multicollinearity, Total assets and Invest-
ment success are left out from this model specification. Non-policyholder liabilities again enter
our regression with a both statistically and economically significant coeﬃcient. A one-standard-
deviation increase in Non-policyholder liabilities is associated with an increase of 0.44 (0.033 x
0.135) percentage point in MES. Leverage is both statistically and economically highly significant
in this specification as well. An increase in leverage by one standard deviation is associated with
an increase in an insurer’s exposure to systemic fragility of 1.39 percentage points (0.004 x 3.47).
Board size is weakly statistically significant in this model and carries a positive coeﬃcient.
In model (3), we add an insurer’s loss ratio to our baseline regression leaving out Asset quality
and Investment success again due to multicollinearity. Surprisingly, Loss ratio does not enter this
regression with a significant coeﬃcient. Insurer size remains a highly significant predictor of an
insurer’s exposure to systemic risk. Non-policyholder liabilities do not enter regression (3) with a
statistically significant coeﬃcient, the magnitude of its economic significance is nevertheless still
large. Firm valuation in form of an insurer’s market-to-book ratio enters the regression statistically
significantly with the expected negative sign.
Regression (4) is the same as our baseline regression (1), except that we now add the liquidity
beta and the returns during the LTCM crisis to our model. The requirement of having data on both
variables decreases our sample size to 64 insurers. Asset quality now enters our regression with a
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(statistically and economically) significant negative coeﬃcient. Higher returns during the LTCM
crisis are associated with a lower exposure to systemic risk during the subprime crisis. This eﬀect is
economically significant, with a one-standard-deviation increase in returns during the LTCM crisis
decreasing an insurer’s MES during the recent financial crisis by 0.89 (-0.042 x 0.213) percentage
point. Otherwise, the results are similar to those in regression (1). Total assets, Investment success
and Non-policyholder liabilities are both statistically and economically significant drivers of an
insurer’s exposure to financial fragility.
Regarding the significance of our variable Investment success, the results stress the importance
of market price risks originating in an insurer’s asset management for its systemic relevance. How-
ever, one could argue that our results are simply driven by the fact that our sample includes both life
and non-life insurers because life insurers, on average, earn a significantly larger portion of their
income from investing in capital markets than comparable non-life insurers. To check whether our
main results hold for both life and non-life insurers, we repeat regression (1) for the sub-samples of
non-life insurers in regression (5). Insurer size remains a statistically and economically significant
driver of a non-life insurer’s exposure to systemic risk, although the variable’s significance loses
in magnitude. The investment income to net revenues ratio enters regression (5) with a statistically
significant positive coeﬃcient. Surprisingly, the economic significance of our variable Investment
success is considerably larger than in regression (1) as a one-standard-deviation increase in In-
vestment success increases a non-life insurer’s MES by 2.16 percentage points (0.161 x 0.134).
A more pronounced financing via non-policyholder liabilities is no longer a significant driver of
systemic risk exposure. Global activity enters our regression statistically significantly but the eco-
nomic significance is of this eﬀect is limited. Otherwise, our previous results remain valid in this
subsample analysis.
One issue with the significance of the investment income ratio in our regressions is that the
positive correlation between an insurer’s investment income and its MES could be spurious because
both variables could be driven by a firm’s aﬃliation to the life insurance business. On the one hand,
engaging in the life insurance business naturally influences an insurer’s investment income ratio
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because it shifts the insurer’s primary source of profits from underwriting to asset management.
On the other hand, however, systemic risk exposure could also be higher for life insurers because
of generally higher leverage, a higher potential of policyholder withdrawals during a financial
crisis and the increasing popularity of policies that include variable annuities (Harrington, 2009;
Cummins and Weiss, 2010; IAIS, 2012). To control for this possibility, we estimate an unreported
regression in which we include a dummy variable that takes on the value one if an insurer is active
in the life insurance business and zero otherwise. As expected, our life insurer dummy is strongly
correlated with our Investment activity variable and moderately correlated with the investment
income ratio. Using Investment success together with the life insurance dummy in our baseline
setting, wee find that our main results remain unchanged. An insurer’s investment income ratio
remains a statistically and economically significant predictor of systemic risk exposure, whereas
the life insurer dummy does not enter the regression with a significant coeﬃcient.
We also estimate an unreported regression of MES in which we use all insurers in our full
sample but only employ the three main variables from the IAIS methodology. The exclusion of
the remaining hypothesized indicators of systemic relevance increases the adjusted R2 compared
to regression (1) from 0.455 to 0.496. None of the additional insurer characteristics for which we
control enter this regression with a significant coeﬃcient. Thus, the main result from this analysis
is that again we find an insurer’s exposure to turmoil in the financial sector to be increasing in firm
size, stronger activity and success in asset management and higher non-policyholder liabilities.
We also examine whether the eﬀects that we find between an insurer’s MES and several of
our firm characteristics are driven by the inclusion of reinsurers in our sample. The findings
in the previous literature on the question of whether reinsurers increase or mitigate the danger
of a systemic crisis are inconclusive. For example, a study by Swiss Re (2003) concludes that
reinsurance insolvencies do not pose a systemic risk because primary insurers usually spread
their reinsurance cessions across several reinsurers and across countries. A similar stance is
taken by the Group of Thirty (2006), which argues that even the defaults of large portions of
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the reinsurance business would not lead to contagion in the global financial sector.26 How-
ever, Cummins and Weiss (2010) argue that reinsurers could be vulnerable to a retrocession spiral
whereby the failure of major reinsurers triggers the failure of their reinsurance counterparties. As
a result, the defaults of several reinsurers could then spill over to primary insurers and possibly
to other financial intermediaries. To control for a bias in our results caused by the inclusion of
reinsurers, we estimate an unreported regression in which we only use the primary insurers in our
sample (and excluding 16 reinsurers). Firms are classified as reinsurers if they assume more than
50% of their total written premiums from reinsurance or if the firm name suggests that reinsurance
is the firm’s major line of business. Untabulated results on the average MES show that reinsurers
are less exposed to systemic risk (MES=5.07%) than primary insurers (MES=6.88%). Reinsur-
ers, however, are still considerably vulnerable to financial instability. Furthermore, the results on
the hypothesized drivers of an insurer’s systemic relevance also hold when excluding reinsurers.
Insurer size, investment success and non-policyholder liabilities remain both statistically and eco-
nomically significant predictors of MES in our regression.
In regressions (6) to (10), we address the related question which factors drive an insurer’s
contribution to systemic risk. We use the same sets of explanatory variables as before but use the
ΔCoVaR of U.S. insurers as our dependent variable in these regressions. In our regression baseline
regression (6), Total assets is identified as a significant determinant of an insurer’s contribution
to systemic risk with a one-standard-deviation increase in insurer size decreasing the insurer’s
ΔCoVaR by 0.40 percentage points (-0.002 x 1.993). The only other significant variable in this
setting is Other income, which enters regression (6) with a weakly significant positive sign. It is
important to note that the adjusted R2 (8.6%) is considerably lower in the regression of ΔCoVaR
than in the regression of MES. Regression (7) adds leverage to our baseline regression. This
analysis is not successful as leverage does not enter this regression with a significant coeﬃcient
and the adj. R2 is negligible (0.6%). Including the loss ratio of insurers in regression (8) does not
26 The few related studies in this field arrive at similar conclusions. For example, the hypothesis that reinsur-
ers are not a source of contagion is empirically confirmed for the Dutch insurance sector by the study of
van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
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change our conclusions. Insurer size and Other income remain the only significant determinants
of an insurer’s systemic risk contribution. In regression (9), we further include Liquidity betas and
LTCM returns and find the former to be significantly positively correlated with ΔCoVaR. In line
with our expectation, insurers that had invested in more illiquid assets before the crisis (and were
not able to easily sell of assets at fair value during the crisis) contributed less to systemic risk.
Otherwise, our results remain unchanged. Finally, regression (10) uses only the sub-sample non-
life insurers. In this regression, Total assets and Other income loses all their statistical significance.
Conversely, assuming more premiums from reinsurance has a stabilizing eﬀect on systemic risk
for non-life insurers. At the same time, engaging in too many specialty lines of insurance and a
larger board size both increase a non-life insurer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Next, we turn to a sensitivity analysis of the level of explanatory power that our independent
variables possess. The results of this analysis are presented in Table V.
– insert Table V here –
Again, we repeat our regressions using both the insurers’ MES (Panel A) and ΔCoVaR (Panel
B) as our dependent variables. Regressions (1) through (10) each use the IAIS indicators of sys-
temic relevance one at a time. The results in Panel A from the regressions of MES show that an
insurer’s size, investment income ratio, investment activity and reliance on non-policyholder liabil-
ities are all highly significantly positively related to the insurer’s MES. The adjusted R2 is highest
(41.8%) for regression (1) in which we employ Total assets as the only independent variable. Re-
gressions (2) through (4) also exhibit significant levels of explanatory power with an adjusted R2
of 19.8%, 20.6% and 7.7%, respectively. Regression (11) uses all indicators proposed by the IAIS.
Using the full set of indicators, however, does not significantly improve the model’s explanatory
power because the adjusted R2 only increases by 4.2 percentage points compared to model (1). We
thus find further evidence that insurer size, higher investment activity and non-policyholder liabil-
ities are the key drivers of systemic risk exposure in the insurance industry. In Panel B of Table V,
we repeat our sensitivity analysis for by regressing ΔCoVaR on the IAIS variables one at a time.
The results from this analysis clearly show that insurer size is the only relevant determinant of an
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insurer’s contribution to the systemic risk of the U.S. financial system with all other IAIS factors
being statistically insignificant.
Our results thus far stress the findings that large U.S. insurers both contributed and were ex-
posed to considerable systemic risk during the financial crisis and that the systemic risk exposure
of insurers as measured by an insurer’s MES was predominantly driven by size, non-traditional
financing and the reliance on investment income. At the same time, an insurer’s contribution to
systemic risk seems to be driven only by insurer size. An important question to address in this
context is whether MES and ΔCoVaR themselves are suitable measure of systemic risk. Moreover,
a regulator’s decision on the question of whether an insurer is systemically important is a dichoto-
mous one. To this end, we first define the systemically most exposed financial institutions as those
firms that were in the top MES quartile during the crisis. Admittedly, this definition of systemically
relevant insurers is somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, we believe this criterion to be suﬃciently
selective because the sub-sample of insurers in the top MES quartile includes all six U.S. insurers
that received bailouts under the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. Second, we
define the most systemically important insurers as those companies that required aid under TARP.
Table VI shows the results of probit regressions of the membership in the top MES quartile on the
same set of explanatory variables used in our linear regressions. All specifications report marginal
eﬀects. Additionally, we estimate probit regressions of a dummy variable that takes on the value
one if an insurer received a bailout under TARP.
– insert Table VI here –
Insurer size, investment income and non-policyholder liabilities before the crisis are all associ-
ated with a higher probability of becoming severely exposed to systemic risk during the subprime
crisis. The eﬀects that we find for these three factors are both statistically and economically sig-
nificant. In our most comprehensive model specification (4), a one-standard-deviation increase in
insurer size increases the probability of an insurer belonging to the top MES quartile by 13.95
(0.070 x 1.993) percentage points. Correspondingly, a one-standard-deviation increase in an in-
surer’s investment income ratio and non-policyholder liabilities are associated with increases of
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5.86% (0.434 x 0.135) and 7.33% (0.320 x 0.229), respectively, in the probability of suﬀering
the most externalities due to the crisis. The remaining variables have no power for predicting an
insurer’s membership in the top MES quartile. Overall, the results of the probit regressions are con-
sistent with our previous results. While our linear regressions emphasize that size, non-traditional
funding and reliance on investment income increase an insurer’s systemic risk exposure, the pro-
bit regressions corroborate the finding that these three indicators can indeed be used to identify
insurers that suﬀered the most during the financial crisis. In addition, we also estimate probit re-
gressions of the probability to receive a bailout under TARP. In line with our findings from the
analysis of the insurers’ ΔCoVaR estimates, the contribution of an insurer to systemic seems to be
only driven by insurer size. We find in regression (9) that a one-standard-deviation increase in firm
size is associated with a 11.56% (0.058 x 1.993) increase in the likelihood of requiring a bailout
under TARP. The remaining factors proposed by the IAIS do not have significant predictive power
for an insurer’s systemic importance.
3.3 Robustness checks
In addition to the regressions discussed earlier in Section 3.2, we investigate the robustness of
our results using several other specifications and other data. To save space, the results of these
robustness checks are not tabulated but are available from the authors upon request. Our main
regression is based on a relatively small data sample of 89 observations. Consequently, the results
that we find could be driven by a few outliers, such as AIG. To tackle this possible problem and to
minimize the confounding eﬀect of outliers, we estimate median regressions that aim at approxi-
mating the conditional median of our response variable. Our main conclusions on the determinants
of an insurer’s MES are robust to this additional specification. The coeﬃcients on total assets, in-
vestment success and non-policyholder liabilities remain strongly economically and statistically
significant in these regressions.
Some of our explanatory variables, such as Loss ratio, exhibit extreme outliers for some in-
surers. To control for the possibly biasing influence of these outliers on our results, we estimate
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regressions in which we winsorize our explanatory variables at the 1% and 99% quantiles (see
Fahlenbrach et al., 2012, for a similar approach). We find that our findings are qualitatively and
quantitatively robust to this alternative specification. We also employ the variable Net revenues as
an alternative to Total assets in our regressions. The correlation between both variables is 0.94, and
not surprisingly, our cross-sectional results remain unchanged when using Net revenues to proxy
for insurer size.
We also estimate several other regressions similar to those in Table IV using the liquidity betas
and LTCM returns in diﬀerent regression specifications. In addition, we estimate regressions in
which we use an insurer’s return on assets as a further explanatory variable. Using this approach
does not change our conclusions. Whereas both Liquidity beta and Return on assets enter none of
our regressions with significant coeﬃcients, the insurers’ buy-and-hold returns during the LTCM
crisis are strongly negatively correlated with the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk during the
financial crisis in these alternative models.
Next, one might be concerned that our results are mostly driven by our choice of a financial
sector index in the computation of the insurers’ Marginal Expected Shortfalls. As a robustness
check, we re-estimated an insurer’s MES using the Datastream US Full Line Insurance Index to
proxy for the insurance market’s return. The diﬀerences between the two approaches are indistin-
guishable from zero because the MES estimates for the two indexes show a positive correlation
of 99.86%. It could also be criticized that the use of a narrow sector index could bias the MES
estimates upwards as within-industry correlations are generally higher than across-industry corre-
lations. Consequently, we also re-estimate our measures of systemic risk using the broader S&P
500 index instead of a sector index. Doing so does not change our findings reported in the previous
sections. Moreover, it could be argued that our static estimation of the MES does not appropriately
account for possible time variation in an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. In particular, our
results may be primarily driven by just a few days around the collapse of Lehman Bros. on which
all markets around the world plummeted. To address this concern, we estimate regressions in which
we use the average MES estimated dynamically from the model of Brownlees and Engle (2012) as
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our dependent variable. Furthermore, we split our sample period in half and re-estimate the MES
for both sub-samples before and around the collapse of Lehman and AIG. We then estimate regres-
sions based on both sub-samples as well as using the ΔCoVaR estimates as dependent variables.
Again, we find that our main conclusions are unaltered by these alternative specifications.
In addition to MES and ΔCoVaR, we also estimate the SRISK measure of Brownlees and Engle
(2012) and Acharya et al. (2012). Descriptive statistics on SRISK and Total SRISK are given in
Table I. Furthermore, we estimate unreported regressions of Total SRISK on the IAIS and control
variables. The estimates on Total SRISK underline the notion that most smaller insurers did not
contribute significantly to systemic risk. However, several large insurers including, e.g., AIG, Pru-
dential, Metlife and Genworth have Total SRISK estimates that imply a considerable contribution
to overall systemic risk. Most importantly, our regressions of Total SRISK confirm the robustness
of our findings from the previous analysis of ΔCoVaR. The contribution of an insurer to systemic
risk as measured by its Total SRISK is driven predominantly by insurer size and, to a lesser extent,
by the insurer’s global activity and the number of business line the insurer is active in.
A further potential problem with our regressions is that our results could be driven by unob-
served diﬀerences in state regulation of insurers in the U.S. For example, both the exposure and
contribution of insurers to systemic risk could be influenced by diﬀerent statutory reserve regula-
tion or diﬀerences in state guarantee funds across U.S. federal states (see also Koijen and Yogo,
2013). To control for this possible obmitted variable bias, we estimate additional regressions where
we control for state fixed eﬀects. The unreported results show that our findings from Section 3.2
remain quantitatively and qualitatively the same.
Finally, we estimate an insurer’s MES and ΔCoVaR based on alternative definitions of the crisis
period. To be precise, we estimate MES and ΔCoVaR using the periods of December 2007 to June
2009 and July 2007 to December 2009. Using these periods does not change our findings.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we find that several insurers contributed significantly to the instability of the U.S.
financial sector during the recent financial crisis. We find that an insurer’s size, its reliance on in-
vestment income and non-policyholder liabilities before the crisis predict its exposure to systemic
risk during the recent financial crisis. At the same time, the contribution of an insurer to systemic
risk is predominantly driven by its firm size. The economic magnitudes of these eﬀects are highly
significant and our results hold regardless of whether we include reinsurers in our sample. Further-
more, our key result on the positive correlation between an insurer’s investment income ratio and
its systemic risk contribution cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the income sources of life and
non-life insurers because we find similar results for both business lines.
Given our main results on the key determinants of an insurer’s systemic risk contribution,
the current initiative of the IAIS for identifying globally systemically important insurers must be
re-evaluated. Our findings are only partially consistent with the current hypotheses of insurance
regulators on the origins of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Hypotheses regarding the
destabilizing side eﬀects of non-traditional financing and investment income, as well as the too-
big-to-fail hypothesis, are all strongly supported by our analyses. In contrast, we find no evidence
that supports the view of regulators that leverage, global diversification, short-term funding or sub-
stitutability significantly increase an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. Our results emphasize
that the current plans of the IAIS require considerable improvement. Global activity and the oﬀer
of specialty insurance should not be penalized by regulators because these factors do not cause an
insurer to become systemically relevant. Our evidence shows, however, that insurers can pose a
threat to financial stability simply by becoming too-big-to-fail.
The practical importance of our analysis to regulators and supervisors is significant. Insurers
that had the highest systemic risk contribution in our estimations included all U.S. insurers that
required assistance from the U.S. government under TARP during the crisis. The proxies that we
use for an insurer’s systemic risk contribution are thus excellently suited for identifying institutions
that became systemically relevant during the crisis. Again, we find that size, non-policyholder
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liabilities and investment income are significant predictors of an insurer’s probability of becoming
significantly exposed to adverse eﬀects in a crisis. At the same time, the probability of requiring a
TARP bailout can only be explained by an insurer’s firm size.
Although we demonstrate that insurers did contribute to systemic risk during the crisis, our
analysis should not be misinterpreted as an investigation into the origins of the crisis. While our
empirical evidence supports the notion that insurers (such as AIG) contributed to systemic risk, we
do not analyze the question of whether insurers also triggered (at least in part) the events leading to
the crash in 2008. In addition, our study is concerned with the systemic risk contribution of the U.S.
insurance industry only. Further research should attempt to analyze global insurers’ contribution
to systemic risk and to determine whether diﬀerences in global insurance regulation can aﬀect an
insurer’s systemic relevance.
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Appendix I: Sample Insurance Companies.
The appendix lists all insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample is constructed by first
selecting all insurers from the country and dead-firm lists of Thomson Reuters Worldscope. The list is then corrected
for all companies for which no 10-K filings could be found in the Morningstar Document Research database for the
year 2006. Companies in the Worldscope and Morningstar databases are matched according to their ticker symbol.
The names of the companies are then retrieved from the Worldscope database (item WC06001) and sorted according
to their ticker symbol.
Atlantic American Corp. MetLife, Inc.
ACE Limited Meadowbrook Insurance Group Inc.
Arch Capital Group Ltd. Markel Corp.
American Equity Investment Life Holding Co. MGIC Investment Corp.
American Financial Group Inc. National Interstate Corporation
AFLAC Inc Navigators Group Inc.
AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. National Security Group Inc.
Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. National Western Life Insurance Company
American International Group, Inc. OneBeacon Insurance Group, Ltd.
Assurant Inc. Old Republic International Corp.
The Allstate Corporation Principal Financial Group Inc.
American Independence Corp. Progressive Corp.
Amerisafe, Inc. Presidential Life Corp.
American National Insurance Co. Phoenix Companies Inc.
The Chubb Corporation Protective Life Corporation
Citizens Inc. ProAssurance Corporation
Cincinnati Financial Corp. PartnerRe Ltd.
CNA Financial Corporation Prudential Financial, Inc.
CNO Financial Group, Inc. Radian Group Inc.
Delphi Financial Group, Inc. Everest Re Group Ltd.
Employers Holdings, Inc. Reinsurance Group of America Inc.
Eastern Insurance Holdings, Inc. RLI Corp.
EMC Insurance Group Inc. RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd.
First Acceptance Corp. Safety Insurance Group Inc.
FBL Financial Group Inc. SeaBright Holdings, Inc.
Fidelity National Financial, Inc. StanCorp Financial Group Inc.
FPIC Insurance Group Inc. Selective Insurance Group Inc.
Global Indemnity plc Stewart Information Services Corporation
Genworth Financial Inc. State Auto Financial Corp.
Triple-S Management Corporation Federated National Holding Company
Hallmark Financial Services Inc. The Hanover Insurance Group Inc.
HCC Insurance Holdings Inc. Torchmark Corp.
Harleysville Group Inc. Transatlantic Holdings Inc.
The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. The Travelers Companies, Inc.
Horace Mann Educators Corp. Tower Group Inc.
Hilltop Holdings Inc. United Fire Group, Inc.
Independence Holding Co. Unico American Corp.
Infinity Property and Casualty Corp. Unum Group
Investors Title Co. Universal Insurance Holdings Inc.
Kansas City Life Insurance Company Validus Holdings, Ltd.
Kemper Corporation W.R. Berkley Corporation
Loews Corporation White Mountains Insurance Group, Ltd.
Lincoln National Corporation XL Group plc
MBIA Inc. Alleghany Corp.
Mercury General Corporation
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Appendix II: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study.
Variable name Definition Data source
Systemic risk measures
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined in Acharya et al. (2010) as the average return on
an individual insurer’s stock on the days the S&P 500 Financials Sector Index experienced
its 5% worst outcomes during the time period of July 2007 to December 2008.
Datastream, own. calc.
Dynamic MES Dynamic Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined inAcharya et al. (2010) and calculated
following the procedure laid out byBrownlees and Engle (2012).
Datastream, own. calc.
ΔCoVaR Unconditional ΔCoVaR as defined in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), measured as the
diﬀerence between the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the S&P 500 Financials Sector Index con-
ditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR of the S&P 500 Financials
Sector Index conditional on the median state of the insurer.
Datastream, own. calc.
Total SRISK Average annual estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed byAcharya et al. (2012)
and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The SRISK estimate for bank i at time t is given by
S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
) − (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t where k is a regulatory capi-
tal ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the bank’s book value of debt, LRMESi,t is the long run
Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · dynMES ), dynMES is the dynam-
ically estimated Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the bank’s market value of
equity.
Datastream, own. calc.
SRISK The contribution of insurer i at time t to aggregate SRISK. It is defined as S RIS K%
i,t =
S RIS Ki,t∑
j∈J S RIS K j,t with J being the set of all insurers in the sample with positive values
for Total SRISK. The estimates are then averaged over the crisis period as defined in our
empirical study.
Own. calc.
Insurer characteristics
Asset quality Ratio of the value of bonds below investment grade (investment rating of Ba1/BB+ and
lower) held by the insurer and total investments.
Worldscope (WC18701,
WC02255), own calc.
Board size Natural logarithm of the number of directors on an insurer’s board. ESG ASSET 4 (CGB-
SDP060) and Morningstar
(DEF 14A filings).
Board independence Percentage of independent outside directors on the board of directors. ESG ASSET 4 (CG-
BSO07S) and Morningstar
(DEF 14A filings).
Fixed income Ratio of fixed income securities investment to total investment. Worldscope (WC02215,
WC02255), own calc.
Income variability Standard deviation of the insurer’s return on assets during the years 2004 to 2006. Worldscope (WC08326),
own calc.
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity.
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Life insurer Dummy variable that takes on the value one for life insurers (SIC codes 6311, 6321) and
zero otherwise.
Worldscope (WC07021).
Liquidity beta The beta factor of an insurer with respect to liquidity innovations as defined by
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) using a regression of monthly stock returns in excess of
the three-month T-bill rate during the years 2004-2006 on the excess returns of the S&P
500 index and liquidity innovations.
Datastream, own calc.
Loss ratio Claim and loss expense plus long term insurance reserves divided by premiums earned. Worldscope (WC15549).
LTCM return Buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock between August 3, 1998 until the trading day
in 1998 on which the insurer’s stock attained its lowest price. If the lowest price occured
more than once, the return is calculated using the first date on which it occured (see
Fahlenbrach et al., 2012).
Datastream, own calc.
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Appendix II: Variable definitions and data sources. (continued)
Variable name Definition Data source
Market-to-book ratio Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Worldscope (WC07210,
WC03501), own calc.
Operating eﬃciency Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999), own calc.
Return on assets Pre-tax return on assets. Worldscope (WC08326).
Short-term funding One minus long-term total debt divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255), own calc.
Key IAIS indicators of systemic relevance
Assumed reinsurance Ratio of assumed reinsurance premiums to total premiums written. Worldscope (WC01004)
and Morningstar (10-K
filings).
Ceded reinsurance Ratio of written premiums ceded to reinsurance to total premiums written. Worldscope (WC01004)
and Morningstar (10-K
filings).
Global activity Number of countries in which an insurer operates a sales oﬃce and/or subsidiary including
the home country.
Morningstar (10-K fil-
ings), corporate websites.
Investment success Ratio of the insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Investment activity Ratio of the insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment in-
come and absolute earned premiums.
Worldscope (WC01002,
WC01006), own calc.
Non-policyholder liabili-
ties
Ratio of the total on balance sheet liabilities minus total insurance reserves (including ben-
efit and loss reserves, unearned premiums, policy and contract claims and other reserves)
to total liabilities.
Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030), own calc.
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope (WC01001).
Other income Other pre-tax income and expensesbesides operating income, non-operating interest in-
come, interest expense on debt, interest capitalized, pre-tax extraordinary charge, pre-tax
extraordinary credit and increase/decrease in reserves.
Worldscope (WC01262).
Substitutability Number of lines of specialty insurance (financial guarantee, mortgage guarantee, export
credit, marine and/or aviation coverage) in which an insurer operates.
Morningstar (10-K fil-
ings).
Total assets Natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets at fiscal year end 2006. Worldscope (WC02999).
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: U.S. bank and insurer returns during the financial crisis.
The figure shows the plots of the returns on the Datastream U.S. Life Insurance, U.S. Non-Life Insurance and U.S.
Bank indexes as well as the Dow Jones Industrials Index. The data are taken from the Thomson Reuters Financial
Datastream database and cover the period from 01/01/2007 to 12/31/2009. All data series of log returns are normalized
to 100 at the start of 2007.
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Figure 2: Daily Marginal Expected Shortfall of insurers during the financial crisis.
The figure shows daily estimates of the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of U.S. insurers computed using the
dynamic model specification of Brownlees and Engle (2012). For each day, estimates for all insurers between the 5%-
and 95%-quantiles (area shaded in grey) as well as the mean MES estimate (solid line) are shown. The sample consists
of 89 U.S. insurers.
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Figure 3: Systemic risk contribution versus systemic risk exposure.
The figure shows a scatter plot of the ΔCoVaR estimates for U.S. insurers their respective Marginal Expected Shortfalls
(MES). Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix II. The sample consists of 89 U.S. insurers that
are identified in the plot by their ticker symbols.
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Figure 4: Insurer size predicts systemic relevance during the financial crisis.
The figure shows a scatter plot of the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of U.S. insurers against the insurers’ (log)
total assets. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix II. The sample consists of 89 U.S. insurers
that are identified in the plot by their ticker symbols.
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Figure 5: Investment success predicts systemic relevance during the financial crisis.
The figure shows a scatter plot of the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of U.S. insurers against the insurers’ ratio
of investment income to net revenues. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix II. The sample
consists of 89 U.S. insurers that are identified in the plot by their ticker symbols.
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Table I: Descriptive statistics.
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 89 U.S. insurers. All variables and data sources are defined in
Appendix II. Net revenues and Total assets are given in $ billion. Total SRISK is given in $ thousands. Accounting
data are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006.
Minimum Maximum 5% Quantile 95% Quantile Mean Median Standard
deviation
Systemic risk measures
- MES -0.0066 0.1868 0.0184 0.1407 0.0650 0.0591 0.0376
- Dynamic MES -0.0271 0.4249 0.0236 0.1701 0.0696 0.0580 0.0567
- ΔCoVaR -0.0085 -0.056 -0.0538 -0.0097 -0.0370 -0.0387 0.0117
- SRISK 0.0000 0.4600 0.0001 0.0304 0.0112 0.0015 0.0494
- Total SRISK 0.60 45155.05 5.32 2987.76 1102.92 151.10 4850.44
Insurer characteristics
- Asset quality 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03
- Board size 4.00 17.00 5.40 15.00 10.04 10.00 2.84
- Board independence 0.43 0.92 0.59 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.11
- Fixed income 0.42 1.00 0.60 0.99 0.82 0.83 0.12
- Income variability 0.00 17.08 0.10 5.21 1.73 1.32 2.18
- Leverage 1.25 21.49 1.56 11.48 4.59 3.34 3.47
- Liquidity beta -0.25 1.33 -0.05 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.16
- Loss ratio 0.00 15.75 0.25 1.92 10.19 0.64 1.89
- LTCM return -1.00 0.02 -0.66 -0.11 -0.31 -0.27 0.21
- Market-to-book ratio 0.42 5.12 0.85 2.86 1.61 1.47 0.66
- Operating eﬃciency 0.01 1.63 0.06 0.64 0.25 0.20 0.24
- Return on assets 0.47 35.69 0.84 9.00 4.37 3.81 4.37
- Short-term funding 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.12 0.00 0.24
Additional indicators of systemic relevance
- Assumed reinsurance 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.03 0.27
- Ceded reinsurance 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.44 0.15 0.10 0.15
- Global activity 1.00 86.00 1.00 42.60 8.03 1.00 16.04
- Investment success -0.27 0.57 -0.20 0.19 0.00 -0.01 0.13
- Investment activity 0.00 0.96 0.03 0.69 0.20 0.12 0.20
- Non-policyholder liabilities -0.72 0.92 0.03 0.62 0.26 0.22 0.23
- Net revenues 0.05 114.14 0.09 26.03 6.11 1.81 14.23
- Substitutability 0.00 5.00 0.00 4.00 1.65 1.00 1.13
- Total assets 0.22 979.41 0.271 170.03 45.03 7.26 130.96
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Table VI: Probit regressions predicting membership in the top MES quartile and TARP bailouts.
The table shows the marginal eﬀects from probit regressions predicting whether an insurer’s contribution to the over-
all systemic risk of the U.S. financial sector during the financial crisis, proxied by the insurer’s Marginal Expected
Shortfall, is in the top quartile, and whether an insurer received a bailout under the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP). Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix II. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.
***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable Top MES quartile Insurer received TARP bailout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total assets 0.093*** 0.070** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.058**
(3.882) (2.506) (2.935) (2.675) (2.222)
Investment success 1.009*** 0.434* 0.096 -0.401 -0.316
(3.459) (1.663) (0.659) (-1.366) (-0.901)
Non-policyholder liabilities 0.554** 0.320* 0.239** 0.192* 0.187
(2.592) (1.804) (2.193) (1.667) (1.018)
Short-term funding 0.236 -0.291
(1.418) (1.180)
Assumed reinsurance -0.240 -0.129
(-1.347) (-0.362)
Ceded reinsurance -0.058 -0.213
(-0.214) (-0.728)
Global activity -0.001 -0.001
(-0.585) (-0.892)
Substitutability -0.040 0.024
(-1.027) (0.737)
Other income 0.234 -0.029
(0.593) (-0.109)
Asset Quality -0.800 1.354
(-0.431) (0.916)
Fixed Income 0.199 0.074
(0.570) (0.362)
Market-to-book -0.065 0.060
(-0.852) (1.010)
AIC 86.980 88.930 97.997 89.058 34.825 47.581 43.186 35.262 46.888
number of observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
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